Algerian Women between French Emancipation and Religious Domination on Marriage and Divorce from 1959 Ordonnance no. 59-274 to the 1984 \u3cem\u3eCode de la Famille\u3c/em\u3e by de Abes, Teresa Camacho
Journal of International Women's Studies
Volume 12
Issue 3 Arab Women and Their Struggles for Socio-
economic and Political Rights
Article 13
Mar-2011
Algerian Women between French Emancipation
and Religious Domination on Marriage and
Divorce from 1959 Ordonnance no. 59-274 to the
1984 Code de la Famille
Teresa Camacho de Abes
Follow this and additional works at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws
Part of the Women's Studies Commons
This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts.
Recommended Citation
de Abes, Teresa Camacho (2011). Algerian Women between French Emancipation and Religious Domination on Marriage and
Divorce from 1959 Ordonnance no. 59-274 to the 1984 Code de la Famille. Journal of International Women's Studies, 12(3), 201-216.
Available at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol12/iss3/13
                                    Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 12 #3                                     201       
Algerian Women between French Emancipation and Religious Domination on 
Marriage and Divorce from 1959 Ordonnance no. 59-274  
to the 1984 Code de la Famille 
 
By Teresa Camacho de Abes1 
 
Abstract  
The impact of the Code de la famille on Algerian women has been felt for 27 
years and criticism of it is based on is supposed adherence to Sharī’ah. This is not an 
adequate assessment of this legal document or its amendments. It is a more complex issue 
that involves the attempt of society to re-define its identity as Algerian and Islamic after 
independence.  In attempting to establish Algerian women's identity there was a shift 
from fearless independent combatants who moved among men during the struggle for 
independence to a space for women as strictly wives and mothers within the context of 
the home. The analysis is based mainly on the Code de la famille as well as the Qur’ān 
and it demonstrates that is not exclusively based in elements of Sharī’ah but rather a 
patriarchal framework supplemented by elements that are not truly Islamic. 
 




Women were an integral part of the liberation struggle and they were sisters in 
arms to their Algerian brothers in the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération 
Nationale - FLN).  Had it not been for women such as Djamila Bouhired, and Djamila 
Boupacha and Zohra Drif who were instrumental in strategic operations as depicted in 
Pontecorvo’s The Battle of Algiers (La battaglia di Algeri), Algerians would not have 
won their independence.  Women were on the front lines of the battle against the French 
and were more fearless than their FLN colleagues in perpetrating violence.  Throughout 
the process these same women believed that they would also be integral to the new 
government and that they would have equal rights as Algerians after independence.  The 
1962 Algerian Constitution guaranteed “the same rights and same duties” (Article 12); 
“the right to vote” to every citizen at least 19 years of age” (Article 13) as well as 
obligatory education “offered without other discrimination than that resulting from the 
aptitude of each individual (Article 18).  However, at the same time, Algerians shouted 
“Algérie musulmane.” And this is also reflected in the same constitution in Article 17 
which states, “The family, the basic unit of society, is placed under the protection of the 
state” and also in Article 4 “Islam is the religion of the State…”  This shift toward an 
Islamic identity was in direct response to being forced by the French to accept a 
Francophile identity that made no provision for Islam but did identify Algerians as 
distinct from the French.  And the dual focus of religion and family signaled a change in 
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identity for women especially those who had fought with men and moved among men 
during the war.  In order to be accepted into the new national and Algerian framework 
women were expected to shift to pre-war patriarchal patterns and roles.   
Ten women were elected deputies of the new National Assembly and one of them 
was Fatima Khemisti.   It was Khemisti who drafted a bill to raise the minimum age of 
marriage for women to 16 and allow women more educational opportunities. (Moghadam 
133-134).  This bill was a step toward allowing women access to roles as students and 
professionals.  During this time (after the war) there were exorbitantly high marriage and 
birth rates (Moghadam 135).  Between Ben Bella and Boumediène the regularization of 
equal rights did not materialize for women.  And during the presidency of Houari 
Boumediène there was a policy against any form of birth control unless a woman already 
had four children. 
The underlying project of the government was socialism and growth of the 
Algerian population as a traditional and family-centered society as outlined in the 
constitution.  As such, on the surface it seemed to be shifting away from Islam, and if that 
was the intention-the Algerian pubic may not have been ready to discard Islam or 
patriarchy from its identity or its mores.  It was an arduous journey from a Sharī’ah-
based society (pre-colonization) to the secular French legal code (which defined 
Algerians as inferior) and then to a constitution and legal code which had an identity 
crisis as mostly secular with Islam as the state religion and later through the patriachically 
defined aspects of the Code de la Famille.  
Algerian society was attempting to re-define its identity after gaining 
independence and is still doing so in the contemporary day.   It continues the struggle to 
define itself as a more open and less repressive society within the context of its Maghrebi 
neighbors as well as within the greater context of the Middle and Near East (MENA).  
The importance of understanding and following amendments to the Code de la Famille 
allows a nuanced and profound understanding of how to strategize and work with 
Algerian feminists such as Louisa Hanoune to reach a solution that will be equitable to 
women in matters of marriage, divorce, child support and alimony after a divorce. 
However, there must also be room to include Islam as per Māliki maddhab (one of the 
four schools of Islamic jurisprudence and the one followed in Algeria) in order to 
accommodate the Islamic portion of Algerian identity.   
Algeria as a country is complex and it would follow that so are its politics religion 
and law.  In attempting to establish a framework from where to examine the Code de la 
Famille and its current implications for women (in terms of marriage and divorce) most 
work consulted takes a decidedly secular, feminist and mostly anti-Islamic stance. 
According to Jasmine Zine, “…there is no cohesive framework for feminism shared 
among the variously oriented Muslim women who operate from either secular or 
religious paradigms.”  This creates an issue of misreading Algeria in terms of politics, 
religion, law and also many feminist writers fail to contextualize the impact of the Code 
de la Famille on women in terms of history.  And by history I mean a history of French 
colonization and the impact of policies imposed by the French on Algerians as second-
class citizens of Algeria as a French départment (administrative division of France) and 
also the reaction to the proposed eradication and uprooting of aspects of Algerian identity 
such as language and more importantly for this study – of religion.   
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A framework by which to examine Algerian women vis-à-vis the Code de la 
Famille must also take into account the legal and political dimensions and their relation 
to the economy after independence, women, minority and religious movements and their 
missions to acquire positions of power within the context of Algerian society and 
government and thus acquire full agency. 
 “The fetishism of the concept, Islam, in particular, obscures the living reality of 
the women and men subsumed under it. North African and Middle Eastern societies are 
more complex and more diverse than is admitted, and cannot be understood in terms of 
monolithic, unitary concepts. To understand the role of religion in women's lives, we 
must identify the conditions under which it emerges as a significant factor, as well as 
those that limit its scope. In addition, we must address the ways in which religious 
symbols are manipulated by both women and men in everyday life as well as in 
institutional settings.” (Lazreg 96) It is this aspect which takes center stage on the issue of 
the Code de la Famille because throughout many studies, particularly by feminists, it is 
termed an Islamic legal construct.  This demonstrates a lack of knowledge of Islamic law 
and a comparative analysis of some of the articles of the Code de la Famille and the 
statutes set forth by Sharī’ah law will prove that the former is not an Islamic text but 
simply a law dressed in a patriarchal mantle with a badly interpreted Islamic design. 
Additional factors to consider are the history of marriage and divorce in terms of 
the legal precedent set by the French rulers in 1959, the rights of Algerian citizens set 
forth in the Algerian Constitution of in its various iterations (1962, 1976 and amendments 
1988, 1989, 1996); also the impact of oil wealth; the opening of elections to a multi-party 
system; the return to the one-party system; defining the Algerian state and identity, 
women’s movements and the Algerian Civil War. 
 
Ordonnance No. 59-274 - 1959  
The Ordonnance No. 59-274 was a personal status law that established  
the following norms for marriage and divorce: 
 
-minimum age of marriage as 15 years for females and 18 for males 
-mutual agreement of both parties 
-contracting the marriage publicly and officiated by a state official 
-dissolution of marriage by either party 
-dowry is not a condition to establish the validity of a marriage 
 
With the establishment of the Ordonnance, a qāḍī  (judge who adheres to Sharī’ah 
in issuing legal rulings) was not involved in the divorce process and therefore Islam was 
extracted from something fundamental to the Islamic family.  Under this law, women 
were able to be awarded damages with interest in a divorce per the decision of a judge 
and custody of children was given to women.  
The law was meant to integrate French legal precedent in the guise of giving 
Algerian women legal rights and freedom.  It was the culmination of the psychological 
warfare begun in May 1958 through mass demonstrations. During these events "officers 
secretly orchestrated mass demonstrations during which columns of Algerian women 
marched into the central Algiers Forum and “spontaneously” unveiled and joined hands 
with ecstatic European crowds in acts of inter-racial “fraternization.” So successful were 
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the propaganda impacts in the international media that the generals immediately decided 
to accelerate the emancipation agenda…and this proved to be a “radical tampering with 
the religious status quo, and a “powerful attack on the Muslim statut personnel ” 
(personal status). (McMaster 98) The mission to free subjugated women from the 
shackles of Islamic men was only a superficial success for the French but would prove a 
lasting legacy after the retreat of the colonizers and well into the era of Algerian 
independence and even into the present-day. 
 
Algerian Oil Wealth 
 
“A second secular nationalist state, Algeria, achieved independence after a 
bloody civil war and over 130 years of “White Settler” French 
colonialism…Algeria does not have a precolonial history of rule by a 
legitimate and/or deeply rooted state. Without this historical resource, the state 
and the nation had to be constructed by the National Liberation Front (FLN) 
in the face of opposition and indifference from communities fragmented by 
geography, ethnicity, region, language, and (most important) their degree of 
assimilation into French culture. Resistance to centralized rule has a long 
history, one that manifested itself in nationalist, millenarian, and populist 
movements, most recently expressed as Islamic resistance to French 
colonialism during the independence movement.” (Lubeck 306-307). 
 
“Boumédienne nationalized the oil industry in 1971 which created 
state revenue to a grand level.  This revenue in turn was used to promote and 
finance heavy industry.  Under Boumédienne there was sustained and 
considerable economic growth.  With a solvent economy and steps toward 
industrialization there was a need for man power in these sectors and women 
were encouraged to be mothers and homemakers (birth control was opposed 
except in cases were there were at least four children) in order to grow the 
population because a large population ensured power according to 
Boumédienne.  According to Moghadam, 97.5 % of Algerian women were not 
employed in 1979 at the end of the Boumédienne government.  However, they 
were contributing to the development of Algerian society by producing 
children, raising them and receiving state subsidies to do so.  Women’s role in 
society and their progress cannot be measured strictly by their employment 
opportunities.  Education should also be taken into account and under the 
policies of Boumédienne more opportunities for women’s education were 
created.” (Camacho 4) 
 
“Since 1975, the regime has followed the standard script of the 
petroleum-boom driven rentier state described above—a strategy marked by 
euphoria, corruption, expansion of education, increasing inequality, neglect of 
agriculture, a bloated, inefficient public service, massive rural to urban 
migration, and a poorly conceived, state-centered industrialization strategy 
favoring heavy industry.” (Lubeck 307)  Opportunities for education were 
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created and progressively more and more women took advantage of these 
resources and were at the forefront of movements for social change. 
  
After a period of relative stability under Boumédienne, Algeria experienced 
economic decline due to corruption followed by massive unemployment and a general 
feeling of anger at government.  “Drastic economic decline in both Algeria and Egypt left 
large numbers of the unemployed to fend for themselves. Political elites began to borrow 
on world markets but were unable to generate enough income to service the debt and an 
increased dependence on France.” ( Lubeck 317) It was this environment of less 
opportunity and less economic stability that gave a space for the growth of Isalmist 
movements such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), women’s movements and the 
nationalist movement who all sought agency within a young Algeria.  These problems 
were popularly viewed as caused by the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the rampant 
corruption of the military officials who were basically at the seat and power base of 
government especially after the death of Boumédienne and the installation of Chadli 
Bendjedid.  The various groups gave people hope for fomenting change and gaining 
rights either as Islamists, as women or as Berbers within the Algerian state framework.  
For Berbers (Amazigh) there are several grievances against the Algerian 
government and they are vocal about having agency and access as Algerians.   However, 
they seek recognition for their language and their culture, which pre-dates Arab presence 
in Algeria, within the constitution and as full-fledged Algerians.  Berbers have led mass 
demonstrations in their struggle since the 70s, culminating in the 1980 Berber Spring 
(Printemps berbère) and subsequently in 1988’s Events of October 5 (Les événements du 
5 octobre) and Black Spring (Printemps Noir) in the Kabyle between April 2001-April 
2002.  The Algerian government officially recognized Tamazight, the Berber language, 
but did not give it the same status as Arabic or even French.  Also, 2005 saw the 
inauguration of the nation’s first Tamazight television channel and with these important 




“Algerian culture defies cursory definitions. Caught between clashing 
civilizations, modern Algerians of diverse origins have made legitimate claims 
to various parts of their cultural history, whether Arab, Berber, or French. 
During the struggle for liberation Algerians combated issues of language and 
identity to fight the French, and since independence in July, 1962, questions 
of language and culture absorbed Algerian politicians and intellectuals as they 
assumed the responsibility of rebuilding a riven nation. In the course of 
reconstruction many learned that a shared understanding of the past became a 
prerequisite for dealing with the present. While understanding characterized 
Algerian discourse, it did not imply agreement. As Algerians came to terms 
with the past, they had to confront the diversity of their experiences.” 
(Kashani-Sabet 264) 
 
Even with the diversity of experiences in Algeria there was a need to unite the 
country after independence and this was done largely through the Arabization and 
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Islamization of the country.  Algerians were to be a nation of Arabic-speaking Muslims.  
“The Arabic and Islamic tradition of the Algerian nation has been preserved through 
constitutional provisions recognizing its fundamental role in developing Algerian 
political character and national legislation encoding its existence in Algerian daily life--in 
courts and in schools, on street signs, and in workplaces. Arabization is seen as a means 
of national unity and has been used by the national government as a tool for ensuring 
national sovereignty.” (Chapan Metz)  
President Boumédienne used the policy of Arabization to solidify an Algerian 
identity and Arabic was used in public signage, the educational system, courts and 
government offices even though “60 percent of the population could not read Arabic.” 
(Chapan Metz)  This was done to leave the French legacy behind and sever all ties to the 
colonizer though it met with problems and continues to pose a problem for minority 
communities such as the Berber groups.  Among them, the Kabyle have demonstrated 
and been particularly vocal in their struggle to include their language and culture as part 
of what can constitute Algerian identity.  Kabyles has been involved in trying to gain 
recognition of Berber identity and rights and key figures in that struggle have been Saïd 
Sadi, an Algerian (Berber) politician and President and founder in 1989 of the 
Rassamblement pour la Culture et Democratie (RCD).    
There had been dissatisfaction and unrest in the wilaya (province) of Tizi Ouzou 
since 1980 when a conference on ancient Kabyle poetry given by Berber writer Mouloud 
Mammeri was canceled.  This led to demonstratons in the Kabyle region and Algiers the 
day after on 11 March and continued with unrest in Algiers on 7 April which led to 
rampant arrests as well as one death and a strike at the University of TIzi Ouzou.  This in 
turn led to a general strike in Kabylie and the UNJA (student union/organization) 
denounced the demonstrations.  Instead of using the opportunity to create a space for 
dialogue with the Berbers – President Chadi Benjedid gave a speech in which he stated 
that the country was, “Arab, Muslim and Algerian” wherein “democracy did not mean 
anarchy.” 
In an interview conducted with an Algerian biology teacher now residing in the 
United States, the university strikes adversely impacted her education by forcing her to 
take breaks during her university studies during the frequent strikes and later during the 
Civil War.  Rather than completing her undergraduate degree in three years it took her 10 
years. (Abes)  
These frustrations were also being felt by women who were made aware of the 
secret negotiations and drafting of a Code de la Famille in 1981 and demonstrated against 
it. Also, these demonstrations were a foreshadowing of the mass demonstrations by 
people of all strata of society in October of 1988 and more than 500 were killed. 
 
Algerian Women’s Movements 
“…(T)here has always been representation of women in state bodies; the numbers 
of women, however, have always been very limited, and the elected or appointed women 
were from the ruling party, the FLN. The emergence of a feminist politics critical of both 
fundamentalism and the state has altered the composition and orientation of the newly 
elected women. Among them Louisa Hannoune, leader of the Workers Party, Khalida 
Messaoudi, now of the Rally for Culture and Democracy, and Dalia Taleb of the Socialist 
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Forces Front.” (Moghadam 144)  Dr. Moghadam’s statement that Khalida 
Messaoudi is currently with the RCD is incorrect since she is not part of the organization. 
Given that Moghadam’s paper was published in 2001 she should have been aware of 
Messaoudi’s departure due to strife and problems within RCD and specifically between 
Messaoudi and RCD president Saïd Sadi.  Besides this error there are others in the 
spelling of wilaya, watan and also factual ones which belie a lack of knowledge of Islam 
and an anti-Islamic stance given her origins in an “Iranian elite family” which can mean 
she has sympathies toward the Pahlavis and Iranian monarchical rule and this may 
obfuscate her view of MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region countries that are 
culturally Islamic with an Islamic constitution or elements to their constitutions such as in 
Iran, Algeria and Morocco.  
Khalida Messaoudi, who has been known as Khalida Toumi since her divorce, is 
a very divisive figure in Algeria for her anti-Islamist rhetoric and insistence that women 
should espouse secular mores and dress in a Western fashion.  Toumi is regularly 
portrayed in political cartoons in Algerian newspapers such as Echorouk and El Watan 
and in an excessively short mini skirt with a crazed or paranoid look in the leading 
newspapers in her capacity as Minister of Culture and the Official Censor of books 
unfavorable to the Bouteflika government.  Additionally her comments on Islamic topics 
particularly polygamy demonstrate her lack of Islamic knowledge and are the reason for 
her unpopularity particularly with the the religious and also the Islamist segments of the 
population.    
According to the Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa,  
Toumi founded the Women's Grouping (Collectif féminin) in 1981 in reaction to the 
proposed government ban on Algerian women traveling without a mahram (a male that is 
forbidden in marriage to a woman and who acts as an escort when traveling) and the early 
and secret drafts of the Code de la Famille.  Toumi went on to lead the Association for 
Equality between Men and Women (Association pour l'égalité devant la loi entre les 
femmes) a Trostsky-Marxist groupand co-found the Algerian League of Human Rights. 
 Throughout her career she has been anti-Islamist and in favor of canceling the 1992 
elections wherein the FIS was supposed to win in a run-off election.  Toumi stated in 
Unbowed: An Algerian Woman Confronts Islamic Fundamentalism (Une Algérienne 
debout), “that the FIS displayed  absolutely all the classic ingredients of totalitarian 
populist movements.” The title of the book in French simply means an Algerian (woman) 
Standing  or An Algerian (woman) Stands up rather than the sensationalist English title 
which plays up the “War on Terror” and fear of Islamic fundamentalism.   
Toumi may have been at the forefront of the women’s movement in the past but 
has lost much credibility for her staunchly anti-Islamist stance as well as distancing 
herself from the Berber constituency which helped put her in power.  She is now part of 
the Algerian government and since 2003 has been the Minister of  Culture under 
Bouteflika.  Before she was appointed as Minister of Culture she tried to cull public favor 
through comments questioning polygamy in Islam for men and demanding the same right 
for women made on television and in several prominent Algerian newspapers such as El 
Watan and Echourouk.  These comments have made her a target of Islamists.  As 
Minister of Communication and Culture and a sycophantic supporter of President 
Bouteflika, she has prohibited the publication of books by prominent intellectuals and 
public figures such as Mohamed Benchicou and Mehdi El Djezaïri which expose 
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Algerian history and instances of corruption and executions of revolutionaries.  These 
acts of censorship have been documented extensively in the Algerian (French and Arabic 
language media) and French press.  Toumi does not hide her totalitarian stranglehold and 
has been skewered in the press recently for her blockage of the book on Colonel 
Amirouche by her former colleague Saïd Sadi.  Toumi has come a long way from being a 
mathematics teacher and now her stance is aligned with the Algerian government because 
she firmly entrenched within that system.  The fact that several of the works consulted for 
this project hold her in high esteem makes me question the level of knowledge of 
Algerian history and Islam in Algeria particularly of Moghdam and Salhi. 
Algerian women have had agency in the highest echelons of Algerian government 
through massive and aggressive organization and they have been represented within the 
government body through election as well. One excellent development in the role of 
women is that they “make up 70 percent of Algeria's lawyers and 60 percent of its 
judges.” (Slackman) 
Algeria is one of several MENA countries (Tunisia, Egypt and Qatar (1) to have 
women judges and is ahead in terms of the sheer number of judges appointed.   
 
Part of the hesitation in appointing women judges is based upon the section  
in the Qur’ān from Sura an-Nisa' 4:34 
 
Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah  
has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they  
support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are  
devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband's) absence what Allah  
would have them guard. As to those women on whose part ye fear  
disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (Next), refuse to share  
their beds, (And last) beat them (lightly); but if they return to obedience,  
seek not against them Means (of annoyance): For Allah is Most High, great 
(above you all).  
 
There has been discussion and issuance of fatāwā (legal rulings) by the Fatwā 
Committee of Al Azhar University which in the past has stated that women were not to 
be appointed as judges or to positions of public authority due to their menstrual cycles 
and a predisposition to emotional responses shortly before and during this time.  This in 
turn would interfere with the ability to listen to the facts of a legal matter and render 
judgment.  Some of the exegesis of the aforementioned sura delineates men as 
“protectors and maintainers of women because they have one more (strength) which can 
potentially point to men not going through monthly menstruation and therefore 
maintaining their strength in both physically and mentally.  There has also been a shift in 
interpretation that advises that there is no problem in appointing women judges as per 
Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi the former Grand Mufti and Grand Imam of Al Azhar 
University.  As part of this trend toward giving access to women to positions of authority 
it is also being mirrored in the religious realm in Syria where Grand Mufti Ahmad 
Badreddin Hassoun has begun training women to become muftis (a Muslim scholar and 
interpreter of Sharī’ah who has authority to write legal opinion (fatwā)) and issues legal 
rulings according to an interview he granted Al-Arabiya in June 2008. 
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This is in accordance with several ḥādīth and is in accordance with the four 
schools (Madhahib) of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh).  Algeria practices Islam according to 
the Mālikī madhhab, which uses the Qur’ān and Sunnah as well as traditional opinions 
(ra'y) and analogical reasoning (qiyas) to interpret Sharī’ah.   The Mālikī madhhab also 
has the law book Kitab al-Muwatta'  that is used as a legal reference.  The book was 
written by the students of Mālik ibn Anas (founder of the madhhab)  and it details Islamic 
law as practiced in Medina during Ibn Malik’s time and it sets legal precedent and an 
example to follow in rendering legal rulings. The manner in which Sharī’ah is practiced 
in Algeria could account for the larger representation of women as judges and 
representation in government in comparison to other countries in the MENA region. 
Also, women dominate in the field of medicine and this could be viewed as an 
asset in terms of society and the creation of a mentoring sytem of women physicians who 
could serve as mentors to other women considering medicine as their chosen field of 
study.  This also allows for religious women to have access to women doctors to 
medically evaluate them given that they would never allow another male including a 
doctor to see or their unclothed bodies.  
Increasingly, women contribute more to household income than men and have 
moved into fields of commerce as business owners.  
"The situation in Algeria has changed rapidly, much faster than was 
expected…All the stereotypes we held have now disappeared," according to the 
Nasreddine Hammouda, a statistician at the Centre for Research into Applied Economics 
(CREAD).  She goes on to state that women return to work after marriage and child 
bearing and due to many possessing higher education degrees than in the past.  For these 
women a career is important before and after giving birth.  By having careers Algerian 
women also have more economic purchasing power through their own salaries as well as 
household budgets provided by their husbands.  The longer-term advancement for women 
is knowing that they can provide for themselves and not live in fear that they will have 
nothing to live on if their husbands were to divorce them. (Ouali) 
“Sixty percent of university students are women, university researchers say.” 
Algeria is a country in flux in the throes of renewal and change and it would be best if the 
path taken is a middle path that is not completely French-based nor based wholly on the 
severe interpretations of Islamic law because those who would be most affected would be 
women and by extension children. (Slackman) 
 
Code de la Famille 
 
“Although the authors of this Code claim it to be merely based on the 
teachings of Sharī’ah law, it is clear from its text that its roots emanate from a 
tradition of patriarchy and misogyny in Algeria, which was taken up in a 
particular way in the post-colonial era…Algeria, where women were seen (as 
in the pre-revolutionary period) as the repositories of men’s honour; as 
guardians of the traditional values which had been disrupted and devalued by 
the colonial presence. They were also symbols that represented the conflicts 
inherent in the new historical situation faced by post-colonial Algeria. Hence, 
the Family Code placed limits on women’s mobility.”  (Salhi 30-31) 
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“The Algerian Constitution of 1989 provides for equality of both men and women 
(Articles 28) and equal rights for all citizens (Article 30) and also that the official religion 
is Islam (Article 2).  From this construct is it truly such a stretch to re-introduce elements 
of Sharī’ah?  It would follow that this is a reaction of the marginalization of this religion 
under French colonization.  Any discussion on Algeria must take into account the role of 
Islam in Algeria before the French incursion.  The Mālikī madhhab had been highly 
influential and had developed and solidified its dominance in Algeria and the rest of the 
Maghreb as well as al-Andalus from early in Islamic history.  It shared space with the 
Hanafi madhhab for matters involving Ottomans during Ottoman rule from 1518-1816.   
Under Ottoman rule the role of Islam was not de-legitimized but rather 
strengthened and Islam’s sphere of influence was great.  While under French colonization 
it collided with Western law and Sharī’ah was subjugated to a lesser status and de-
legitimized in the name of establishing French law.”  (Camacho 6) 
Under the guise of the mission civilisatrice  (civilizing mission) the French were 
being benevolent to their subjects and in opposition to Islamic invaders of lands that were 
not their own– they did not contextualize their legal codes to take into account 
Mālikī fiqh, local custom or traditions.  And perhaps even more problematically they used 
lands for viticulture previously used to cultivate wheat which went against the Islamic 
prohibition against alcohol.   
In 1881, the French instituted the Code de l'indigénat (Indigenousness Code) as 
indirect law and this solidified the classification and legislation of the second-class 
personal status of native Algerians in what was formerly their land, their country.  The 
French considered Algeria a département  (administrative division) of France. Indirect 
law was not effective given that there were many French citizens on Algerian soil and the 
divide between who was and who was not French continued to grow when in 1870 the 
Crémieux Decree granted citizenship to Sephardic Jewish natives of Algeria as well as 
European Jews living in Algeria. This was truly problematic in that it caused tense 
relations between Arabs and Berber natives and their Sephardic compatriots and would 
deteriorate completely in the1950s and unto the 1960s. 
 
“Sharī’ah took into context local traditions, common practices and the 
law was applied to each case per the merits of the situation not as in Western 
law with specific punishments and a delineation of specific crimes.  Justice 
was meted out according to the circumstances and particulars of the case as 
well the customary law of the land. The French wanted to translate and codify 
the law and limit it to personal status issues only which resulted in a situation 
that did not take into account these complexities and nuances of the intricate 
legal underpinnings and framework of Sharī’ah.  By doing this the French 
took the Sharī’ah out of context which is counterproductive to a 
modernization process since it only took one of the many aspects of Islamic 
law and tried to apply them and make them fit a Western legal framework 
which would then be applied in Muslim countries.  Under occupation any 
person could opt for the French civil code in legal matters.” (Camacho 6-7) 
  
“Along with the Algerian constitution that guarantees women equality 
they have had to contend with the Family Code which was introduced in 1984.  
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Before that year women did not have to have a mahram or his consent in order 
to marry or act as her representative in the proceedings.  The Code de la 
Famille puts women in a position in relation to men – be it as daughters or 
those who need a guardian or as wives who need the guidance of a husband.  
The Code does stipulate a woman’s working rights but a husband must agree 
to it and he has the right to change his mind.” (Camacho 7) 
 
In the case of divorce, a woman must have consent of her mahram while the 
husband has the right to divorce at any time per his will.  A woman can lose custody of 
her children in some cases of divorce and the wife will be perhaps given the home if she 
has no family to whom she may return.  If children remain with the mother the father is 
still the legal guardian and must be consulted in matters of education, health and well-
being.  And should a woman remarry – she loses custody of her children.  This shift from 
the constitution to the Family Code puts women in detrimental position particularly if 
they are uneducated or illiterate and have no means of their own economic support or 
support from their families. Without education or experience they will be on the street, 
perhaps with children if their husbands divorce them.  This in fact has occurred and 
according to Women’s E-News, “I suffered from the family law in all its horror," she 
recalls. "If I had been able to benefit from housing rights and if I had received a correct 
alimony, I wouldn't have gone through all these difficulties.”  This is just one example of 
a women who was divorced and a husband who had the means to pay alimony but simply 
did not.  In response, the government of President Bouteflika enacted a law in 2005 to 
curtail this problem and prevent the homelessness of divorced women partly caused by a 
severe housing shortage.  “Advocates, however, say the law is not enforced and women 
are still winding up in the streets.” (Rachidi) 
 
“The law is left mostly unenforced even though it has the potential for huge 
impact.  Perhaps a better solution would be a middle path between the 
constitution and the Family Code in order to offer a more equitable solution 
and opportunities for economic solvency, work experience and education for 
women outside the home.  It will ensure their survival in cases of 
abandonment or divorce under unjust circumstances or no alimony.  To 
assume that the Code de la Famille is a manifestation of Sharī’ah is not 
correct.  It is a legal text which purports to be based on fiqh but it is not so.” 
(Camacho 7)   
 
It is a legal text that operates in isolation and does not have the context of Islamic 
law or an experienced qāḍī  to render judgment per the particulars of a case and context 
of the case and circumstances of the couple or family. 
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) states that the Code de la Famille according to its definition of 
discrimination “excludes or restricts on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of 
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of 
their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.”  
The problem with this construct is that it contains a Western bias and does not 
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contextualize the document within a majority Muslim country even though the document 
can only be considered marginally Islamic.  Also, the CEDAW is a UN body which in the 
MENA region is viewed as operating under the aegis of the US and working toward US 
interests and therefore can be perceived as biased.  This stated, Algeria does have a 
representative on this Committee, Meriem Belmihoub-Zerdani.  “The provisions of the 
Convention target all impediments to the advancement of women, whether these 
hindrances exist officially at the government level or behind the closed doors of the 
family home.  The Women's Convention blurs the line between public and private, 
obliging the state and public officials" to resolve private family matters.” (Behrouz 1141)  
Behrouz' analysis of fiqh is elementary at best and from his analysis he places 
Islamic law as a context of limited 'ijtihād (independent juristic reasoning by 
an ’ālim when the Qur’ān and Sunnah set no precedent and there are no previous 
rulingsby other ‘ālim  on the matter being considered). For 'ijtihād to flourish fully it 
would need to become the purview of Sharī’ah  courts staffed with knowledgeable qāḍīs 
(Islamic judges) in mustahabb (marriage, death and family issues) matters to allow for 
specific rulings tailored to each set of constituents in varying circumstances as it was 
prior to French colonization. 
 
Islamist Movements 
“In general, Islamist parties have fared badly in popular elections and 
referendums, however, there are important exceptions to this general trend. The first 
country where the Islamists came to power through electoral processes was Algeria.” 
(Knudsen) This occurred after the Algerian government’s referendum in 1989 for multi 
party elections where the Front Islamique de Salut (FIS) was victorious.  In 1991, the FIS 
was slated to win by a large margin after a lead in the first round.  The Algerian 
government canceled the run-off election and arrested FIS leaders.  This was the impetus 
for the cycle of violence and the Algerian Civil War that took the lives of “left 200,000 
Algerians dead and approximately 15,000 forcibly disappeared” according to a figure 
cited by Al Jazeera in November 2010. 
The perpetrators of violence are not believed to be the FIS  but rather the Armed 
Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armée or GIA) who operate on the margins of 
Algerian society.   
The GIA has been blamed for massive violence against journalists and 
intellectuals (both men and women) as well as women deemed un-Islamic (those not 
wearing hijab or working outside the home) have borne the brunt of kidnapping, torture 
and rape. 
 “Most of the Middle Eastern states are run by autocratic regimes bent on keeping 
Islamists from gaining power, both through denying them a popular vote and by brutal 
suppression of their leaders and followers. To many analysts, it is exactly the prevalence 
of autocracy in the Middle East that has given rise to Islamist movements, which are seen 
as a way of expressing popular sentiment against illegitimate rulers.” (Knudsen) There 
exists support of an Islamic agenda and political parties and platforms in terms of 
women’s status founded on justice and equitable solutions rather than gender equality 
that can according to some analysts be called Islamic feminism.   According to 
Krennerich and Thibaut the FIS won 47.3 % (voter turnout was 59%) of vote during the 
first multi-party elections in 1991.   
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Islam as a motivator and as national identity has roots in pre-colonial Algeria as 
well as in contrast to French colonial constructs of “free” Algerian women during anti-
colonial struggles.  Stated differently religion and family were important vis-à-vis the 
Algerian woman without her hā'ik (body covering which also incorporated a head 
covering worn by women in the Maghreb) and images of French women “unveiling” 
Algerian women publicly in 1958.  Some Islamic feminists are well aware of their rights 
within Islam and work to educate others so that they are also aware and able to advocate 
for themselves.  Examples of Islamic womanhood cited by Islamic feminists to be 
followed are Khadījah, Maryam, ʿĀʾisha and Fatima.  The reality is that even though 
many Algerian women who are religious Muslims do know the stories of the 
aforementioned great women of Islam they possess little or no knowledge of their rights 
in terms of marriage, divorce, children and maintenance as per Islam.  One way to make 
progress in this realm would be the Islamic education of women to empower them to 
have the knowledge and understanding of Islamic law in general and specifically as it 
pertains to their rights and therefore advocate for themselves.  
On the other hand, there are issues of interpretation by groups such as FIS and 
GIA that are not only patriarchal but more specifically erroneous when it comes to 
addressing secular feminist grievances about issues as diverse as hijab, working outside 
the home and traveling without a mahram. Women are seen as either following Islam or 
they are seen as modern and transgressive.  Simply by reading Algerian newspapers, 
watching Algerian news and films (Rachida and Bent Keltoum) one becomes aware that 
women who did not wear hijab and were out alone walking to work or school or perhaps 
anywhere for that matter, were kidnapped off the street.  Some were killed, some were 
taken to mountain refuges and kept as sex slaves and later returned to families who 
wanted nothing to do with them.   
“Countries in the Middle East have pursued different strategies vis-à-vis the 
Islamist threat.” (Knudsen) Algeria’s strategy had in the past been a laissez-faire attitude 
and there are incidents such as Bentalha massacre of 1997 where 400 people were 
massacred and the earlier Raïs and Beni Messous massacres  (though there were others) 
where approximately  400 and 100 were massacred  by armed guerrilla fighters.  Both 
villages are on the outskirts of Algiers in a zone of various military bases but the military 
did not intervene to prevent the violence.  There has been widespread speculation of 
government collusion in these incidents and a book about the incident written by a 
survivor – Nesroullah Yousof Bentalha titled Qui a tué à Bentalha? (Who Killed at 
Bentalha?) documents the events leading up to the massacre such as the leave offered to 
security forces which protected the area;  how the village was illuminated by projectors to 
facilitate access during the cover of night; a military helicopter hovering above the 
massacre; road blocks to prevent access to the village by outsiders as well as open access 
and a route out of the village by the attackers.  There is also a book by an officer in the 
Algerian Special Forces -  Habib Souaïdia - La Sale Guerre (The Dirty War) with claims 
that he and others participated in various killings and the torture of civilians.  The events 
related are precise with dates and names given.  The issue with both accounts is that there 
are details that are unclear but there is a strong indication that the military is not 
completely innocent in these matters.   More than likely their participation lies 
somewhere between sitting and doing nothing and actually committing the massacres 
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themselves.  More evidence must be examined in order to reach a conclusion and that is 
beyond the scope of the project.  
Whatever the case, the Islamist parties have a firmly entrenched space in Algerian 
politics though only if they act within the framework of the law.  Algerian citizens have 
grown weary of the violence and will not tolerate it as evidenced by an entire village 
finding and rescuing and old man who was kidnapped by GIA rebels in 2010.  The 
villagers warned the GIA members and made them leave the vicinity.  The GIA party is 
not a Muslim group but a group who operates under the guise of what it calls Islam or 
their skewed interpretation of it since it allows for mass rape and killing which are not 
condoned in Islam. 
 
Conclusion 
By examining the Code de la Famille against Islamic law it becomes evident that 
it is not based strictly on Islam.  In the Code de la Famille there are elements that go 
against Islam such as being allowed to be married to two sisters.  Also a man being 
allowed to marry up to four wives with no conditions differs from Islam which sets 
precise conditions before a man can have multiple wives.  Nikah (marriage) does not 
have to be registered with a notary or legal functionary as is the case for marriage as set 
forth by the Code de la Famille. Though Islamic elements exist in the Code de la 
Famille, it cannot be deemed a text of Sharī’ah for it is somewhat divorced from religion.  
Perhaps it should be eliminated completely and members of the ‘ulamā (Muslim legal 
scholars) should be involved in drafting a new Code de la Famille which is equitable to 
women within a Muslim or secular marriage.  Also, terms for maintenance of the woman 
and her children must be specified in the event of a divorce to assure that they are 
provided sustenance and housing and to eradicate the many women who have been cast 
out into the streets with nothing after the advent of the Code de la Famille.  Islam clearly 
commands men to provide for their ex-wives and children. 
Along with the suggested involvement of ‘ulamā in the drafting of a new Code de 
la Famille – women must be included in talks before a draft is written in order to take 
into account their concerns and to allow a context within Algerian society to incorporate 
and accommodate the needs of Algerian feminists whether they are secular or Islamic. 
The new Code de la Famille should be a document the extends rights to all constituencies 
(women, men, religious, secular, Arab or Berber) in an equitable fashion.  It is a process 
that will take time since Algeria is still working toward defining itself as a country but 













                                    Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 12 #3                                     215       
Bibliography 
 
Abes, Fatiha. Personal Interview. 13 August 2009. 
Bachir-Chouikh, Yamina, Ibtissem Djouadi, Bahia Rachedi, Rachida    
Messadouen, Zaki Boulkenafed, Amel Choulkh, and Abdelkader Belmokadem. 2005. 
Rachida. Global lens collection. New York, NY. First Run Features. 
Behrouz, Andra N. "Transforming Islamic Family Law: State Responsibility and the Role 
of Internal Initiative.” Columbia Law Review. 103.5 (2003): 1136-1162. Print. 
Camacho, Teresa.”Status of Women In Algeria After Independence.” Claremont 
Graduate University. (2010) 1-10. 
Chala, Samia, Patrice Barrat, Corinne Godeau, and Sharon Mann. 2007. Chahinaz: quels 
droits pour les femmes? New York, NY. Filmakers Library. 
Servan-Schreiber, Fabienne, Mehdi Charef, Cylia Malki, Baya Belal, Jean-Roger Milo, 
and Fatma Ben Saidane. 2006. Bent Keltoum . New York, NY. First Run 
Features. 
Gribaa, Boutheina, Giorgia Depaoli, and Malek Baklouti. Mapping of the Situation of 
Women Participation in Politics in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Tunis [etc.: 
Centre for Arab women training and research (CAWTAR): with UN-INSTRAW. 
Strengthening women's leadership and participation in politics and decision-
making process in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia project, 2009. Print. 
Gumuscu, Sebnem. 2005. “No Bourgeois, No Moderation: Change in Political  Islam 
in Turkey, Egypt and Algeria.” Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual 
Graduate Student Conference of the Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics, 
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, March 29, 2005 
Fundamentalist Terrorism – the Assault on the Symbols of Secular Power. eScholarship, 
University of California, 1970. Internet resource. 
Islamist Responses to Globalization: Cultural Conflict in Egypt, Algeria, and Malaysia. 
eScholarship, University of California, 1970. Internet resource. 
Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. "The Swinging Pendulum: Linguistic Controversy in Post-
Colonial Algeria." Middle Eastern Studies. 32.4 (1996): 264-280. Print. 
Knudsen, Are. Political Islam in the Middle East. Bergen: CMI, 2003. Print. 
Lazreg, Marnia. "Feminism and Difference: the Perils of Writing As a Woman on 
Women in Algeria." Feminist Studies. 14.1 (1988): 81-107. Print. 
McMaster, Neil. “Colonial “Emancipation” of Algerian  Women: the Marriage Law of 
1959 and the Failure of Legislation of Women’s Rights in the Post-Independence 
Era.” Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift fur kritische Afrikastudien (2007) Nr. 12, 
91-116. Print. 
Metz, Helen C. Algeria: A Country Study. Washington, D.C: Federal Research  
Division, Library of Congress, 1993. Internet resource. 
Moghadam, Valentine M."Organizing Women: The New Women's  
Movement in Algeria". Cultural Dynamics. (2001)13 (2): 131-154. 
---. “Global Feminism and Women’s Citizenship in the Muslim  
World: The Cases of Iran, Algeria, and Afghanistan.” Paper presented to the 
Conference on Citizenship, Borders, and Gender: Mobility and Immobility, Yale 
University, New Haven, May 8-10, 2003. 
Nohlen, Dieter, Michael Krennerich, and Bernhard Thibaut. Elections in Africa:  
March 2011
                                    Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 12 #3                                     216       
A Data Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Print. 
Ouali, Mohand. "Algerian women expand business opportunities."  
Maghrebia 12 December 2010: n. pag. Web. 13 February 2011. 
Rachidi, Illhem. “Algeria: New Law Leaves Divorced Algerian Women Homeless.” 
Women's E-News via WUNRN. 12 March 2007. 1 May 2010. 
http://www.wluml.org/node/3520 
Salhi, Zahia Smail. "Algerian Women, Citizenship, and the 'Family Code'".  
Gender and Development. (2003) 11 (3): 27-35. 
Slackman, Michael. 2007. Algeria's quiet revolution: Gains by women. New York Times, 
27 May 2007. Web. 26 May 2010. 
Zine, Jasmine “Between Orientalism and Fundamentalism:  The Politics of  
Muslim Women’s Feminist Engagement,” in Muslim World Journal of Human 
Rights 3 (2006) 1, Article 5 1-26. 
 
 
 
 
March 2011
